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Abstract	
A	number	of	highly	cited	papers	by	Flyvbjerg	and	associates	have	shown	that	ex	
ante	 infrastructure	 appraisals	 tend	 to	 be	 overly	 optimistic.	 Ex	 post	 evaluations	
indicate	a	bias	where	investment	costs	are	higher	and	benefits	lower	on	average	
than	predicted	ex	ante.	These	authors	argue	that	 the	bias	must	be	attributed	to	
intentional	misrepresentation	by	project	developers.	This	paper	 shows	 that	 the	
bias	may	arise	 simply	as	a	 selection	bias,	without	 there	being	any	bias	at	 all	 in	
predictions	 ex	 ante,	 and	 that	 such	 a	 bias	 is	 bound	 to	 arise	 whenever	 ex	 ante	
predictions	are	related	 to	 the	decisions	whether	 to	 implement	projects.	Using	a	
database	of	projects	we	present	examples	indicating	that	the	selection	bias	may	
be	 substantial.	 The	 examples	 also	 indicate	 that	 benefit‐cost	 ratios	 remains	 a	
useful	 selection	 criterion	 even	 when	 cost	 and	 benefits	 are	 highly	 uncertain,	
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A	 large	 body	 of	 evidence	 shows	 that	 transport	 investments	 are	 often	 subject	 to	 cost	
overruns,	 and	 that	 costs	 have	 been	 underestimated	 on	 average	 (see	 e.g.	 van	 Wee	
(2007);	 a	 summary	 of	 	 several	 studies	 can	 be	 found	 in	 (Lundberg,	 Jenpanitsub,	 &	
Pyddoke,	 2011)).	 This	 bias	 has	 been	 taken	 as	 a	 sign	 that	 cost	 overruns	 cannot	 be	
caused	 simply	 by	 “honest	 errors”	 in	 the	 ex‐ante	 cost	 estimates.	 In	 particular,	 Bent	
Flyvbjerg	and	his	associates	have	published	a	series	of	much	cited	papers	 (Flyvbjerg,	
2008,	 2009;	 Flyvbjerg,	 Holm,	 &	 Buhl,	 2002;	 Flyvbjerg,	 Skamris	 Holm,	 &	 Buhl,	 2004,	
2005)	 that	 indicate	a	persistent	bias	 in	 infrastructure	project	appraisals,	where	 costs	
are	systematically	underestimated	and	benefits	are	systematically	overestimated.	They	
argue	that	the	bias	must	be	due	to	systematic	misrepresentation	by	project	promoters,	




predicting	 the	 future,	we	would	 expect	 a	 less	 biased	 distribution	 of	 errors	 in	 forecasts	
around	zero.”	No	supporting	arguments	for	this	claim	are	provided.		
	








selection	 process	 that	 is	 affected	 by	 predicted	 costs	 or	 benefits	 will	 yield	 biased	
outcomes.	 Hence,	 selection	 is	 a	 very	 plausible	 cause	 of	 observed	 biases	 in	 costs	 or	


















drivers,	 this	would	not	be	overconfidence	(Benoît	&	Dubra,	2011).	 “Regression	to	 the	
mean”	 is	 a	 well‐known	 statistical	 trap	 caused	 by	 selection:	 if	 participants	 in	 some	
experiment	 are	 selected	 based	 on	 some	 characteristic	 with	 random	 variation	 –	 say,	
having	a	high	result	on	a	test	–	then	follow‐up	measurements	of	that	characteristic	(a	








Selection	 may	 cause	 systematic	 cost	 overruns	 and	 benefit	 shortfalls	 for	 transport	
investments.	Imagine	a	decision	maker	faced	with	a	number	of	alternative	investments	










in	 a	 model	 that	 comprises	 a	 noisy	 prediction	 step	 and	 a	 noisy	 decision	 step.	 This	
description	 fits	 easily	 with	 selection	 of	 projects	 from	 a	 list	 of	 projects.	 Such	 a	
description	also	 fits	with	projects	 that	 seem	 to	be	of	 a	more	unique	nature.	Consider	







forecast	 alone	 may	 cost	 several	 hundred	 thousand	 Euros,	 and	 it	 takes	 a	 deliberate	
decision	 to	 incur	 such	 costs.	 Thus	 the	 fact	 that	 estimates	 of	 investment	 costs	 and	
benefits	have	been	prepared	implies	that	some	kind	of	selection	process	will	have	been	
in	 operation.	 It	 is	 hard	 to	 imagine	 observing	 any	 list	 of	 projects	 that	 is	 not	 already	
heavily	selected	under	influence	of	some	preliminary	prediction	of	costs	and	benefits.			
	
Faced	 with	 systematic	 cost	 overruns	 and	 benefit	 shortfalls,	 a	 decision‐maker	 may	
conclude	that	a	stricter	selection	criterion	is	necessary.	For	example,	several	countries	
are	 implementing	 so‐called	 “uplifts”	 in	 their	 procedures	 for	 project	 appraisal	 (as	
suggested	 in	Flyvbjerg,	2008).	However,	we	will	show	that	raising	 the	bar	 for	project	











”With	 errors	and	biases	of	 such	magnitude	 in	 the	 forecasts	 that	 form	a	basis	 for	 cost–
benefit	 analyses,	 such	 analyses	will	 also,	with	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 certainty,	 be	 strongly	
misleading.	 ‘Garbage	 in,	 garbage	 out’,	 as	 the	 saying	 goes.”	However,	 we	 demonstrate	
under	quite	general	assumptions	that	the	average	selected	project	has	a	higher	payoff	
than	 the	 average	 project,	 even	 if	 forecasts	 are	 uncertain.	 Hence,	 selection	 based	 on	
predicted	 payoffs	 is	 still	 beneficial	 in	 this	 sense,	 even	 with	 uncertain	 forecasts.	
Although	 the	 gain	 in	 average	 payoff	 from	 selection	 may	 vary,	 it	 is	 always	 positive	





illustration	 based	 on	 data	 on	 real‐world	 transport	 investments,	 we	 find	 that	 the	
benefit‐cost	 ratio	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 a	 robust	 selection	 criterion	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	
average	 benefit‐cost	 ratio	 of	 the	 selected	 projects	 greatly	 outperforms	 random	
selection	 even	 for	 large	 uncertainties	 in	 benefit	 and	 cost	 estimates.	 Hence,	 the	 claim	
that	“cost–benefit	analyses	[…]	will	be	strongly	misleading”	is	unfounded.			
	
This	 paper	 begins	 in	 section	 2	 by	 formulating	 a	 stylised	model	 of	 a	 project	 selection	
procedure.	The	model	incorporates	the	essential	elements	of	such	a	process,	otherwise	
it	imposes	minimal	structure.	This	ensures	that	conclusions	will	be	applicable	under	a	
wide	 range	 of	 circumstances.	 In	 the	model,	 projects	 are	 decided	 based	 on	 predicted	
payoff	that	is	related	to	actual	payoff.	The	actual	payoff	is	observed	only	after	projects	
have	been	selected	and	only	for	those	projects	that	were	selected.	There	is	a	selection	
mechanism	that	 selects	projects	with	a	probability	 that	 increases	as	a	 function	of	 the	
predicted	payoff.	The	model	assumes	that	ex	ante	predictions	are	unbiased.	In	spite	of	
this,	 the	 model	 shows	 that	 the	 forecast	 error	 will	 be	 positive	 on	 average	 for	 those	
projects	 that	were	 selected	 and	a	bias	will	 seem	 to	 exist.	 Strengthening	 the	 selection	
criterion	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	 bias	 will	 actually	 increase	 the	 bias.	 The	 selected	
projects	will	have	a	higher	average	actual	payoff	than	unselected	projects.	
	
Section	3	 illustrates	 the	 empirical	 relevance	 of	 the	 selection	 bias	 using	 a	 database	 of	





the	 examples	 indicate	 that	 the	 average	 benefit‐cost	 ratio	 of	 the	 selected	 projects	
decreases	only	slowly	as	 the	noise	 in	benefit	and	cost	estimates	 increases.	Hence,	 the	
benefit‐cost	ratio	seems	to	be	a	useful	selection	criterion	even	when	ex‐ante	estimates	
are	highly	uncertain.		
2 A  MATHEMATICAL  MODEL  OF  FORECAST  BIAS  AS 
SELECTION BIAS 
Projects	 are	 drawn	 from	 a	 population	 of	 projects.	 A	 project	 is	 characterised	 by	 a	
random	 variable	 X	 that	 represents	 the	 payoff	 of	 the	 project.	 It	 is	 not	 necessary	 to	
specify	 which	 payoff	 measure	 we	 are	 talking	 about.	 All	 that	 matters	 is	 that	 it	 is	 a	
measure	that	influences	the	decision	whether	to	carry	out	the	project.	
	
The	 project	 payoff	 is	 not	 observed	 initially.	 It	 can	 only	 be	 observed	 if	 the	 project	 is	
carried	out.	At	the	time	a	project	is	decided,	one	observes	instead	the	random	variable	
Y	 that	 depends	 on	 ܺ	 and	 represents	 a	 prediction	 of	 X.	 The	 relationship	 between	
predicted	 and	 actual	 payoff	 can	 be	 specified	 in	 a	 very	 general	 way	 by	 letting	 ܻ ൌ
݂ሺܺ, ߝሻ,	where	 ߝ	 is	 a	 noise	 term	 that	 is	 independent	 of	X	 and	 i.i.d.	 over	 projects,	 and	
where	݂	is	strictly	increasing	in	ߝ.	
 
The	 forecast	error	 is	ܻ െ ܺ	and	we	assume	that	 forecasts	are	unbiased,	which	means	
that	the	forecast	payoff	 is	equal	to	the	actual	payoff	on	average:	ܧሺܻ െ ܺሻ ൌ 0.	This	is	










idiosyncratic	 factors	 in	the	decision	process	by	saying	that	a	project	 is	selected	 if	and	
only	 if	 ܼ ≡ ݃ሺܻ െ ܿ, ߜሻ ൒ 0,	where	 	 is	 a	 random	 term	 that	 is	 i.i.d.	 over	 projects	 and	








illustration,	we	assume	 that	 the	 true	payoffs	 are	 the	 same	 for	 all	 projects.	A	decision	
maker	observes	 forecast	 payoffs,	 illustrated	by	 circles,	 and	only	projects	 above	 some	
selection	threshold	are	realized.	The	true	payoffs	are	revealed	once	projects	have	been	
realized.	It	is	obvious	that	the	true	payoffs	will	on	average	be	lower	than	forecasted	for	
the	 selected	 projects,	 even	 if	 forecasts	were	unbiased	 for	all	 projects.	 In	other	words,	
the	 selection	 process	will	mean	 that	 the	 decision	maker	will	 be	 disappointed	 by	 the	


























ܲሺܻ െ ܺ ൑ ݐ|ܼ ൒ 0ሻ.	
	
Throughout	we	consider	only	situations	where	selection	makes	a	difference,	i.e.	where	
0 ൏ ܲሺܼ ൒ 0ሻ ൏ 1.	The	following	proposition	states	that	the	prediction	error	is	positive	





Proposition	 1.	 Payoffs	 are	 systematically	 overestimated	 for	 the	 realised	 projects:	


















Proposition	3.	If	forecast	error	is	additive	݂ሺܺ, ߝሻ ൌ ܺ ൅ ߝ,	then	the	bias	is	decreasing	as	
a	function	of	real	payoff:	 డడ௫ ܧሺܻ െ ܺ|ܺ ൌ ݔ, ܼ ൒ 0ሻ ൏ 0.		
When	 payoffs	 of	 selected	 projects	 are	 overestimated	 on	 average	 and	 raising	 the	
threshold	 for	 selection	 only	makes	 the	 bias	worse,	 it	may	 be	 natural	 to	 ask	whether	
selection	 actually	 does	 any	 good.	 The	 final	 proposition	 affirms,	 unsurprisingly,	 that	





Proposition	 4.	 If	 ܻ ൌ ݂ሺܺ, ߝሻ	 is	 strictly	 increasing	 as	 a	 function	 of	ܺ,	 then	 a	 selected	
project	yields	higher	payoff	on	average	than	a	random	project:		ܧሺܺሻ ൑ ܧሺܺ|ܼ ൒ 0ሻ.	The	









We	 have	 shown	 above	 that	 predicted	 payoffs	 will	 be	 biased	 as	 soon	 as	 projects	 are	
selected	from	an	underlying	pool	of	candidate	projects,	and	that	this	bias	will	be	larger	
the	stricter	the	selection	criterion	is.	How	large	the	bias	will	be	depends,	however,	on	
the	 noisiness	 of	 forecasts	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 actual	 payoffs.	 We	 are	 not	 able	 to	
directly	observe	these	quantities	since	we	do	not	have	available	a	database	of	forecasts	
and	outcomes	for	both	selected	and	unselected	projects.	What	we	can	do	to	support	our	
story	 is	 to	 use	 numerical	 examples	 to	 investigate	 the	 selection	 mechanism	 with	





The	 numerical	 examples	 are	 based	 on	 all	 461	 suggested	 transport	 investments,	
shortlisted	for	possible	inclusion	in	the	Swedish	Transport	Investment	Plan	2010‐2021.	
The	 investments	 are	 described	 in	 Eliasson	 and	 Lundberg	 (2012).	 Each	 suggested	
investment	has	a	total	benefit	B	and	an	investment	cost	C	and	hence	a	benefit‐cost	ratio	
BCR=B/C.	 In	 the	 simulations,	 we	 will	 take	 these	 to	 be	 the	 true	 benefits	 and	 costs,	
unobserved	by	the	analyst	when	selecting	projects.	The	analyst	only	observes	predicted	
benefits	and	costs	B’	and	C’,	where	ܤ′ ൌ ܤ ∗ ߝ஻	and	ܥ′ ൌ ܥ ∗ ߝ஼	and	ߝ஻, ߝ஼	are	random	numbers	generated	in	our	simulation.	The	analyst	is	assumed	to	select	the	100	projects	




the	relative	cost	error	is	defined	as	 ஼஼ᇲ െ 1.	Note	that	the	relative	cost	error	is	defined	as	the	outcome	divided	by	 the	prediction,	while	 the	 relative	benefit	 error	 is	defined	 the	
other	way	around.	This	 is	consistent	with	much	of	the	literature,	and	will	ensure	that	
estimates	 of	 benefits,	 costs	 and	 benefit‐cost	 ratios	 are	 all	 unbiased.	We	 assume	 that	
benefits	 are	 normally	 distributed	 while	 costs	 are	 lognormally	 distributed.	 With	
ߝ஻~ܰሺ1, ߪ஻ሻ	and	ln	ሺߝ஼ሻ~ܰሺఙ಴
మ
ଶ , ߪ஼ሻ,	we	thus	have	ܧ ቀ
஻ᇲ
஻ െ 1ቁ ൌ 0,		ܧ ቀ
஼
஼ᇲ െ 1ቁ ൌ 0	and,	in	
particular,	 that	 the	 forecast	 of	 the	benefit‐cost	 ratio	 is	 unbiased:	ܧሺܤܥܴᇱሻ ≡ ܧ ቀ஻ᇲ஼ᇲቁ ൌ஻



















in	 the	 predictions.	 For	 each	 simulation,	B	 and	C	 are	 fixed,	 and	 errors	 B	 and	 C	 are	
















In	 this	 example,	 the	 relative	errors	 are	approximately	proportional	 to	 the	underlying	
















from	 this	 list	 of	 candidate	 projects.	 The	 resulting	 biases	 in	 benefits	 and	 costs	 are	
plotted	on	the	y‐axis	against	the	fraction	of	projects	that	are	selected	on	the	x‐axis.	20	





The	 second	 factor	 affecting	 the	 resulting	 bias	 is	 how	 much	 the	 true	 payoffs	 vary	
compared	to	the	noise	in	the	forecasts.	Intuitively,	if	the	best	projects	are	much	better	
than	the	average	ones,	the	best	projects	will	be	selected	even	if	forecasts	are	noisy,	and	
hence	 the	bias	will	 be	 smaller.	 This	 is	 illustrated	 in	Figure	5.	Here,	 true	 benefits	 and	
costs	B	and	C	are	replaced	in	the	simulation	by	B	=	B	and	C	=	C.	The	resulting	bias	in	
benefits	and	costs	is	plotted	on	the	y‐axis	against		on	the	x‐axis.	The	simulations	are	












indicate	 that	 plausible	 values	 of	 benefit	 and	 cost	 uncertainties,	 number	 of	 candidate	
projects	 and	 benefit	 and	 cost	 differences	 between	 candidate	 projects	 can	 easily	 give	
rise	 to	 bias	 of	 this	 magnitude.	 Obviously,	 this	 does	 not	 prove	 that	 intentional	




the	 selection	 criterion	 may	 seem	 dubious.	 Proposition	 4	 states	 that	 choosing	 the	













Figure  6. Mean  BCR  of  selected  projects  (left)  and  percent  correctly  selected  projects  (right)  as  a 








This	 paper	 has	 considered	 a	 process	 whereby	 selection	 of	 projects	 is	 influenced	 by	
some	noisy	but	unbiased	prediction	of	a	payoff.	Under	very	general	circumstances,	such	
a	process	will	lead	to	selection	bias,	i.e.	that	the	predicted	payoff	is	smaller	on	average	




determined	 by	 predicted	 payoffs,	 only	 that	 noisy	 predictions	 have	 some	 influence	 on	
decisions.	Still,	it	might	be	argued	that	cost	overruns	and	benefit	shortfalls	are	unlikely	
to	be	a	result	of	 selection	bias	because	predictions	of	costs	and	benefits	do	not	affect	
decisions.	While	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 benefits	 and	 costs	 do	 affect	 project	 selection	
(Eliasson	 &	 Lundberg,	 2012;	 Nellthorp	 &	Mackie,	 2000;	 Odeck,	 2010),	 other	 studies	
have	 found	 limited	 or	 no	 evidence	 of	 benefit‐cost	 ratios	 affecting	 project	 selection	
(Nilsson,	1991;	Odeck,	1996).	However,	it	seems	safe	to	say	that	predicted	costs	alone	
virtually	always	affect	project	selection,	simply	because	resources	are	generally	scarce.	
Moreover,	 as	 we	 noted	 in	 the	 introduction,	 there	 are	 in	 general	 very	many	 possible	
projects	that	could	be	considered	but	never	make	it	to	the	point	where	predictions	of	
costs	and	benefits	will	be	made	and	published.	This	early	process	is	likely	to	be	affected	
by	 some	of	 the	 same	 factors	 that	 later	might	 cause	errors	 in	predictions	of	 costs	and	
benefits.	 It	 therefore	 seems	 clear	 that	 there	must	 always	 be	 a	 selection	 process	 that	









Given	 the	 large	 uncertainty	 inherent	 in	 predictions	 of	 costs	 and	 benefits,	 one	 may	
question	 the	 usefulness	 of	 basing	 project	 selection	 on	 these.	 This	 is	 for	 example	 the	




cost	 ratio	 is	 a	 surprisingly	 robust	 selection	 criterion	 even	 under	 considerable	
uncertainty,	yielding	much	higher	average	benefit‐cost	ratios	than	random	selection.		
	
One	 of	 the	 suggested	 ways	 to	 remedy	 biased	 predictions	 is	 to	 use	 so‐called	 uplifts,	
whereby	 predicted	 costs	 and	 benefits	 are	 corrected	 by	 the	 expected	 bias	 (Flyvbjerg,	
2008).	If	the	expected	magnitude	of	the	aggregate	bias	is	known	in	advance,	uplifts	can	
be	useful	since	they	enable	more	precise	aggregate	budget	planning.	If	it	is	possible	to	
ascribe	different	uplifts	 to	different	 classes	of	projects,	 using	uplifts	may	 also	 lead	 to	
better	project	selection.	It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	imposing	a	stricter	selection	




existence	 of	 bias	 in	 the	 ex	 ante	 evaluation	 of	 investment	 projects.	 We	 have	 merely	
shown	that	it	is	not	possible	to	conclude	from	the	observation	of	ex	post	bias	that	there	
must	have	been	bias	in	the	predictions	ex	ante.	We	have	also	presented	some	numerical	
evidence	 that	 a	 selection	 process	 on	 its	 own	 is	 enough	 to	 generate	 bias	 of	 typical	
magnitudes,	 given	 plausible	 parameters.	 So	 while	 we	 can	 refute	 the	 argument	 of	
Flyvbjerg,	 we	 cannot	 refute	 his	 conclusion.	 Strategic	 misrepresentation	 by	 project	
promoters	may	well	 exist;	 but	 the	 existence	 of	 systematic	 cost	 overruns	 and	 benefit	
shortfalls	 does	 not	 prove	 this.	 As	 long	 as	 projects	 compete	 for	 selection	 based	 on	
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Consider	 the	 expected	 forecast	 error	 conditional	 on	 selection	 and	 use	 the	 law	 of	
iterated	expectations	to	find	that	
	
ܧሺܻ െ ܺ|ܼ ൒ 0ሻ		
ൌ ܧሾܧሺܻ െ ܺ|ܼ ൒ 0, ܺ, ߜሻ|ܼ ൒ 0ሿ ൌ		
ൌ ܧሾܧሺܻ െ ܺ|ܻ ൒ ܿ ൅ ݃ିଵሺ0|ߜሻ, ܺ, ߜሻ|ܼ ൒ 0ሿ ൌ		





For	 any	 given	 value	 of	 X	 and	 δ,	 ܧሺܻ െ ܺ|ߝ ൒ ݂⁻¹ሺܿ ൅ ݃⁻¹ሺ0|ߜሻ|ܺሻ, ܺ, ߜሻ	 exists	 and	 is	
increasing	 as	 a	 function	 of	 c.	 Hence	 also	 the	 conditional	 expected	 forecast	 error	
ܧሺܻ െ ܺ|ܼ ൒ 0ሻ	is	increasing	as	a	function	of	c.	This	proves	proposition	2.	
	
Let	 now	 ܿ → െ∞.	 Then	 in	 the	 limit	 all	 projects	 are	 selected	 and	 ܧሺܻ െ ܺ|ܼ ൒ 0ሻ →












߲ݔ ܧሺܻ|ܺ ൌ ݔ, ܼ ൒ 0, ߜሻ ൌ 1 െ
׬ ߝ݄ሺߝሻ݀ߝ௖ି௫ା௚షభሺ଴|ఋሻ
ቀ׬ ߝ݄ሺߝሻ݀ߝ௖ି௫ା௚షభሺ଴|ఋሻ ቁ
ଶ ݄ሺܿ െ ݔሻ ൅
ሺܿ െ ݔሻ݄ሺܿ െ ݔሻ
׬ ݄ሺߝሻ݀ߝ௖ି௫ା௚షభሺ଴|ఋሻ
	









߲ݔ ܧሺܻ|ܺ ൌ ݔ, ܼ ൒ 0ሻ ൌ ܧ ൭
߲




















with	݇ ൌ ݂ିଵሺܿ ൅ ݃ିଵሺ0|ߜሻ|ߝሻ	being	an	increasing	function	of	ܿ.		
		
	
